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Homology Across Inheritance Systems 




One might think that if a character resemblance between two lineages is transmitted through 
different channels of inheritance – e.g., genes in one case and culture in the other – then it 
cannot be the result of common ancestry. The assumption that homologies cannot cross 
inheritance systems has framed anthropological debates regarding the phylogeny of complex 
cognitive and behavioural resemblances between humans and common chimpanzees, with 
differences in developmental acquisition taken to imply disparate phylogenetic origins 
(Maestripieri and Roney 2006; Marks 2003; Wrangham and Peterson 1996). In this paper we 
reject the assumption that any character resemblance that is culturally transmitted in one 
species but genetically transmitted in another closely related species is necessarily or even 
probably non-homologous between them.  
We argue that since homology relations can be preserved despite a change in 
developmental mechanisms (§2), they could in principle be preserved across a change in 
inheritance system, even on a stringent account of what it takes to qualify as an inheritance 
system (§3), so long as the trait has been continuously transmitted in a lineage. Then we turn 
to cultural transmission in particular, arguing that it can support phenotypic lineages and 
hence homology relations (§4). We go on to describe two scenarios in which homology can 
cross between genetic and cultural inheritance systems (the processes of genetic and cultural 
assimilation) (§5), and briefly consider whether our points carry over to developmental 
accounts of homology (§6). Finally we set out the implications of this discussion for debates 
over the phylogeny of similar character states in humans and chimpanzees, using intergroup 
violence as an illustration (§7). 
 
2.  Homology Across Change in Developmental Resources 
Reconstructing patterns of evolutionary descent has been one of the central preoccupations of 
biology ever since Darwin sketched the first proto-cladogram in his early notebooks.  
Identifying homologs is crucial to reconstructing phylogenetic relationships and delineating 
monophyletic taxa. On standard phylogenetic accounts of homology, a similar character state 
found in two different lineages is homologous just in case it was present in and inherited 
continuously from their common ancestor.1 Here we adopt this ‘taxic’ homology concept. To 
                                                       
1  This paper does not take a stand on the general ‘problem of homology.’ Instead, we will simply 
stipulate that by ‘homology’ we mean ‘taxic homology’ which we define, broadly following Wiley and 
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accommodate ‘transformational homologs’ (traits that correspond to, but fail to structurally 
resemble, one another), ‘serial homologs’ (e.g., digits or segments within an organism that do 
not share a phylogenetic history), and ancestor-descendant sequences, biologists and 
philosophers of science have offered non-genealogical accounts of homology grounded in 
mechanism and couched either in terms of shared developmental constraints or continuity of 
informational resources involved in development. We will return at the end (§6) to consider 
whether our claims extend to, and perhaps pose problems for, non-taxic conceptions of 
homology. 
 It is clear from work in evolutionary developmental biology that we cannot infer from 
the fact that a shared character state is produced by different developmental mechanisms in 
distinct lineages that it is non-homologous between them (Wagner 2007; Hall 2003). It is true 
that a difference in developmental mechanisms can be evidence against homology. For 
instance, there are fundamental differences in the developmental patterning of camera-type 
eyes in cephalopods and vertebrates, which almost certainly reflect the fact that the last 
common ancestor did not possess the trait. However, evolutionary continuity in 
morphological structures can survive very substantial change in the developmental 
mechanisms by which those structures are realised in embryogenesis. 
 The unexpected resilience of phenotypes across genetic perturbations is now 
extensively documented (de Visser et al. 2003). This flexibility allows that, over evolutionary 
time, different suites of genes may become involved in the development of the same 
structure, which is conserved in distant taxa by stabilising selection (Roth 1991). Weiss and 
Fullerton (2000) have described such genetic turnover as ‘phenogenetic drift’, while Müller 
(2003) has referred to the same phenomenon as the ‘autonomization’ of the phenotype. A 
second type of developmental turnover relates to embryological precursors and patterning 
mechanisms that underwrite what are regarded, for independent reasons, as homologous traits 
(Roth 1988/2001). This developmental variability characterizes early stages of 
embryogenesis such as cleavage, gastrulation and neural tube formation (Rieppel 1992), as 
well as the patterning of vertebrate limb buds and insect segmentation (Pigliucci 2010). 
 In sum, a character that has arisen only once may be preserved in a clade despite 
substantial variation, or even a complete turnover, in its underlying developmental generators 
(Fig.1). This phenomenon of developmental turnover illustrates a more general point about 
homology, namely that homology assessments are relative to a particular grain of analysis—a 
point that has been made forcefully by Hall (2003, 416). Homology at one level of 
description, such as morphology or behavior, need not entail homology at other levels, such 
as developmental, genetic or neuro-cognitive processes. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]   
                                                                                                                                                                        
Lieberman (2011), as ‘character states that are shared by two taxa and inherited continuously from their 
common ancestor’. In contrast, ‘homoplasy’ will refer to qualitatively similar character states that do 
not stem from a common ancestor (and hence diagnose polyphyletic groups). Our focus is therefore on 
the homology of similar character states, rather than on individuated characters whatever their state. 
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While the reality of developmental turnover may be widely appreciated in the ‘evo 
devo’ literature, these crucial lessons have yet to percolate into mainstream evolutionary 
anthropology and comparative ethology, where researchers continue to adhere to 
‘mechanistic’ assumptions in relation to homology. For instance, in considering the 
possibility of homology between human and nonhuman animal behavioral traits, Maestripieri 
and Roney (2006, 125) hold that “homologous traits have, by definition, a common 
phylogenetic history and are produced by similar developmental processes,” (emphasis 
added). They cite the biological homology concept (see §7) in support of the assumption that 
homology implies similar developmental mechanisms. Likewise, skeptics of behavioral 
homology ascriptions between human and non-human primates, such as Gottlieb and 
Lickliter (2004, 317), hold that “homologies in two or more species are presumed to be 
evolutionarily derived from a common ancestor, implying common genetic and other 
developmental components that were present in the ancestor and result in the formal 
similarity of behavior in their descendants.” 
These mechanistic assumptions have infected methodology and inferential reasoning 
in evolutionary psychology. For instance, evolutionary psychologists in the nativist tradition 
often appeal to the taxonomic distribution of a trait (e.g., a putative moral emotion) to support 
their proffered theory regarding its developmental acquisition in humans. More specifically, 
such theorists look for the presence of a proto version of the trait in closely related but 
weakly cultural taxa (such as chimps or other non-human primates), assume that the proto 
trait and full-fledged trait are homologs, and then infer from this homologous relation that the 
trait is a conserved, gene-based adaptation that is ‘innate’ and/or rooted in ‘human nature’ 
rather than culturally acquired in humans (for a critical discussion of this approach, see Prinz 
2008). 
For reasons we shall see, the biological homology concept and similar mechanistic 
approaches to homology can lead to significant confusions when applied to the phylogeny of 
complex behavioral adaptations, which are frequently and problematically set in opposition to 
traits that develop via enculturation (for an example of this framing, see Maestripieri and 
Roney 2006, 131). Furthermore, shifts from the genetic to cultural inheritance system entail a 
more extreme phenotypic decoupling from underlying developmental constraints and even 
the broader genetic substrate than has been contemplated in the ‘developmental turnover’ 
literature. Thus, while our thesis is particularly relevant to evolutionary psychology and 
anthropology, it is also of wider biological significance. 
 
3. Homology Across Inheritance Systems in Principle 
Even if homologies can survive some changes in developmental resources, they still require 
descent—that is, the continuous transmission of the trait in different lineages. Homology is 
only maintained because the factors that cause a phenotypic similarity between parents and 
offspring are transmitted down the generations. One might think then that these factors 
cannot change drastically without disrupting the homology relation. In this section we argue 
that, surprisingly, homologies can subsist across differences in the inheritance mechanisms 
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responsible for transmitting traits down the generations. That possibility can only be assessed 
given an account of what it is for a trait to be transmitted by a particular inheritance system. 
This section sets out one such account and shows that it allows for a homologous trait to be 
transferred from one inheritance system to another. 
 According to a popular but erroneous view of development, genes program, blueprint 
or otherwise causally determine particular phenotypic outcomes. If this were right, then the 
sort of evolutionary change described above in the genetic resources involved in the 
development of a continuously transmitted trait could include a change in the genes that 
program or control development of that trait. Similarly, control could be handed over from 
genetic programs to epigenetic or cultural determinants, or vice versa. Unfortunately for this 
neat account, the picture of genes as the locus of special causal agency in development is 
mistaken (Oyama 2000; Griffiths 2001; Robert 2004; Pigliucci 2010; Bertossa 2011). Genes 
are one amongst many causal factors that make a contingent difference to organismic 
development (Oyama 2000). Without specific details about the developmental system in 
question, there is no basis to say that genes are inherently privileged as a class of causes 
relative to other developmental factors. Genetic differences have a causal influence on 
phenotypic outcomes or bias development in particular directions in just the same way that 
epigenetic, environmental and cultural factors do. 
 Despite having no special causal status in development, genes do of course have a 
special evolutionary role, since they are developmental difference-makers that are reliably 
transmitted down the generations, so that selection can act on the phenotypic differences they 
produce. Furthermore, there is evidence that DNA and its mechanisms of replication, repair 
and expression have been selected to perform this function (Freeland and Hurst 1998). We 
will refer to any mechanism that has been selected to perform the function of transmitting 
phenotypes2 down the generations as an inheritance system (Shea 2007). This is a meta-
function that is additional to the functions of particular genes to produce the particular 
phenotypes for which they have been selected. An inheritance system transmits down the 
generations a ‘resource’ (a genetic variant, epigenetic mark, behavioural variant, etc.), which 
biases the production of a particular developmental outcome on which natural selection can 
then act.  
In addition to DNA, epigenetic systems that stably transmit variants over many 
generations may also have been selected for the meta-function of transmitting phenotypes 
down the generations (Shea, Pen and Uller 2011). Any such mechanism thereby also qualifies 
as an inheritance system. Similarly, some mechanisms of cultural learning and transmission 
may have been selected for their ability to transmit phenotypes down the generations (Shea 
2009), in which case such cultural mechanisms too will constitute an inheritance system. In 
either case, it is a very stringent test. Environmental factors that are causally important in 
development, even if they persist or recur reliably in each generation, are not normally 
transmitted down the generations by a system with the function of transmitting phenotypes 
                                                       
2 We use the term ‘phenotype’ in the broad, ‘extended’ sense to include not only quintessential 
biological structures but also behaviors, mental representations, and artifacts. 
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down the generations, so they will not count as an inheritance system on this test. Likewise, 
developmental changes that are subsequently stabilised by selection on genes (West-Eberhard 
2003) illustrate the general point of developmental turnover, but do not in themselves 
exemplify a change in inheritance systems since the initial developmental change need not be 
transmitted by an inheritance system at all (see also §5.1).  
 In one sense, the claim that homology can be preserved across inheritance systems 
follows straightforwardly from, and is a special case of, the more general claim that 
homology can survive across changes in developmental resources, some of which will be 
inherited from parent to offspring. We think this logical extension is an interesting and 
underappreciated result. While genetic, epigenetic, environmental and cultural developmental 
factors may be to some degree interchangeable, homology can only survive a complete shift 
to a new developmental resource if phenotypic similarity is reliably passed down the 
generations, as this is a necessary condition for sustaining homology relations. If genes are 
the only developmental resources that are transmitted by an inheritance system, then 
homologies will remain tightly if not inextricably linked to genes. If, on the other hand, there 
are non-genetic inheritance systems, then homologies may be preserved even when the genes 
on the basis of which a trait was selected are no longer involved in their development. 
 What would it be for a phenotype transmitted initially by one inheritance system to be 
picked up and transmitted by a different inheritance system? For instance, what would it be 
for an adaptation P selected on the basis of stably transmitted epigenetic variants to come to 
be transmitted by the genetic inheritance system? For that to happen, it would not be enough 
that genes are causally involved in the development of P, nor even that additional genes 
become causally involved in the development of P. The genetic inheritance system would 
only acquire a role in transmitting P if there were relevant phenotypic variation (P vs. some 
different phenotype P’) caused by a genetic difference (G vs. G’), and the fitter genetic 
variant was selected in virtue of its correlation with P. That is, selection on genetic 
differences with respect to P would make P at least a partial gene-based adaptation, even if it 
had initially been selected in virtue of epigenetic variation. Thus, a trait that was initially 
transmitted by an epigenetic inheritance system can come to be transmitted by the genetic 
inheritance system as well. 
 It would be enough for our point about homology to observe that a trait initially 
transmitted by one inheritance system can come to be transmitted by two systems 
simultaneously. However, we should also note that a complete transfer between inheritance 
systems is also possible, due to the kind of change in developmental resources described in 
the last section. Reprising our example, once P has come to be genetically transmitted (in the 
sense defined above), alternative causal routes to the development of P may be available that 
do not rely on the epigenetic mark in virtue of which P was originally selected. If that original 
epigenetic variant loses its causal role in the development of P, then P is no longer being 
transmitted by the epigenetic inheritance system, but now only by the genetic inheritance 
system, and transfer between inheritance systems is complete. We take no stance on whether 
such complete transfer is likely to occur in real cases, restricting ourselves to noting its 
possibility. 
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 Below we will assess the possibility that a culturally transmitted phenotype could 
come to be transmitted by the genetic inheritance system, and the converse. To do this, 
however, we first need to show that phenotypic features whose development depends heavily 
on cultural resources can indeed be the subject of homology relations. 
 
4. Homology in Cultural Evolution 
Our theortical point about the possibility of homology crossing inheritance systems holds 
regardless of whether culture in fact forms an inheritance system that supports homology 
relations. However, if culture were plausibly an inheritance system that supports homology 
relations, and if homology can indeed cross inheritance systems, this would add significant 
force to our critcisms of the ways in which theorists have reasoned with the homology 
concept in disputes over the phylogeny of complex behavioral traits shared between humans 
and other primates (§§2,7).  
Crucially, homology is not limited to structural morphology and its genetic-
developmental underpinnings. Behaviour, which is often evolutionarily conserved, is also a 
proper subject of homology relations and can be used in phylogenetic reconstruction (Rendall 
and Di Fiore 2007; Bertossa 2011; Hall 2013). Although behavior is developmentally labile, 
dependent on environmental input, and realized via disparate ontogenetic pathways, the same 
holds true of morphology, and thus these properties do not preclude its ‘homologization’. If 
we can homologize genetically transmitted behaviors, why should we not be able to do the 
same with respect to culturally transmitted traits? 
Cultural transmission has a number of properties that might give rise to scepticism 
regarding its ability to support homology relations. To appreciate the difficulties that arise in 
attempting to extend the homology concept into the cultural context, it is useful to contrast 
the patterns and processes of genetic and cultural evolution. The phylogenetic reconstruction 
of eukaryotic taxa is possible because there is little significant genetic exchange between 
disparate branches of the eukaryotic tree of life, resulting in a strong signal of vertical 
inheritance that anchors the reconstruction of plant and animal phylogenies. What emerges 
from this process is a bifurcating macroevolutionary pattern that is amenable to cladistic 
analysis.3 Applying cladistics to culture is more controversial because modes of cultural 
inheritance depart significantly from the digital replication and vertical transmission 
exemplified by genetic transmission in eukaryotes.  
Non-vertical transmission in culture is analogous to lateral gene transfer in 
prokaryotes, since it allows for the movement of developmental difference-makers across 
distantly related lineages. Unlike the ‘hard heredity’ associated with genetic replication, 
cultural transmission involves teaching, learning, and imitation, with variants acquired and 
                                                       
3 Animal taxa have been subject to a non-trivial amount of lateral gene exchange mediated by viral 
vectors (Keeling and Palmer 2008), and hybridization between disparate plant species may occur at an 
evolutionarily significant frequency, but these phenomena are not substantial enough to undermine the 
project of using DNA to build phylogenetic trees in eukaryotes. 
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lost within the lifetime of an organism. Moreover, vertical (parent-offspring) relations among 
cultural variants become attenuated as individuals intelligently infer, manipulate, and 
transform them, amalgamating cultural items from disparate social sources (Sperber 1996). 
These factors make it less likely that culture will form discrete lineages. Nevertheless, there 
are strong indications that cultural systems can evolve through a process of descent with 
modification, suggesting that gene-like replication at the organism level is not a precondition 
for cumulative cultural evolution and the phylogenetic reconstruction thereof. 
Firstly, some of the ostensible difficulties for homology that arise in connection with 
non-vertical modes of inheritance can be overcome by adopting a coarser grain of analysis. In 
a recent paper on adaptationism, Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith (2009) argue persuasively that a 
proper description of the evolutionary mechanisms operating on a population depends on our 
perspectival grain of analysis. From a ‘zoomed-in’ perspective of the cultural adaptive 
landscape, we see non-vertical transmission, intelligent manipulation of variation, inference-
generated noise and other dynamics that tend to obscure lineage-like cultural relations. From 
a more zoomed-out grain of resolution, however, corresponding to what Godfrey-Smith 
(2013) calls the ‘meso-evolutionary’ level, we see a discrete network of populations 
exhibiting local cultural variation. The meso-evolutionary perspective reveals selective 
processes acting on stable differences between coherent cultural groups, notwithstanding the 
non-replicative nature of individual-level cultural transmission. The upshot is that token 
cultural copying is not necessary to generate population-level homology relations. 
Secondly, work over the last two decades on cultural evolution has shown that 
distributed information structures and essentially content-neutral copying biases can allow for 
the accumulation of fitness-enhancing cultural variation at the population-level, despite the 
noise and parasite threat associated with non-vertical, inference-modulated cultural 
transmission (Richerson and Boyd 2005). These models indicate that cultural variants need 
not be replicated from individual to individual, so long as members of a cultural group are 
biased toward copying successful strategies and are capable of assimilating characteristics of 
the population as a distributed whole (Henrich et al. 2008; Laland and Brown 2011). 
These theoretical considerations suggest that cultural evolution may operate as a 
broadly Darwinian process at the population level even in the absence of individual-based 
lineages of transmission (Godfrey-Smith 2009). The key empirical issue is whether cultures 
remain sufficiently isolated to sustain distinct traditions that are not swamped by variation 
flowing in from adjacent cultural groups (Boyd et al. 1997). A growing body of empirical 
work has succeeded in reconstructing culture-based phylogenetic trees. For a wide range of 
cultural traits, phylogeny turns out to be a stronger predictor of similarity than geography, 
painting an increasingly lineage-based rather than diffusion-based picture of cultural 
evolution. Cultural lineages have been identified (and genetically corroborated) for traits such 
as subsistence innovations, house-constructing techniques, family and marriage structures, 
sexual division of labour, metal-working technologies (for a review, see Mace and Jordon 
2011), canoe-design (Rogers, Feldman and Ehrlich 2009), projectile points (Buchanan and 
Collard, 2007), textile designs (Tehrani and Collard 2002), languages (Gray et al. 2009), 
semantic distinctions (Jordan 2011) and lexical replacements (Pagel 2009). Moreover, as 
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these methods have been successfully applied to post-Neolithic human populations with 
sophisticated methods of subsistence, communication, trade and transportation, it is likely 
that they would be equally if not more applicable to the smaller hunter-gatherer groups of 
earlier hominin evolution, which were more insulated from other cultures and hence likely to 
exhibit less intercultural blending. 
In sum, although culturally transmitted phenotypes may not follow clean lines of 
descent connecting discrete individuals at the micro-level, in a broad range of cases cultural 
evolution exhibits a tree-like signal that is not washed out by intercultural blending. In this 
context it is legitimate to ask whether a given trait was present and inherited continuously in a 
given cultural lineage. Thus the homology concept can be applied to traits that are the result 
of cultural evolution. For example, two cultures may show similarities and differences in the 
phonetics of the words used in a common basic vocabulary. The homology question relates to 
whether the similarities are due to common descent. Given enough dimensions of comparison 
and the absence of strong external constraints, there can be convincing evidence that the 
similarities were present in the last common cultural ancestor and have been inherited 
continuously in each lineage ever since.  
 
5. Homology Across Genetic-Cultural Inheritance Systems 
In this section we investigate the possibility that homology could subsist across a change 
from genetic to cultural transmission, and vice versa.  
5.1  Change in Developmental Resources vs. Change in Inheritance Systems 
A trait whose development relies to a great extent on cultural factors in one lineage can be 
homologous to a similar trait in another lineage that develops in the absence of, or is 
insensitive to, cultural factors. For example, development of normal skin structure depends 
on vitamin C. Production in vivo in other mammals has been replaced in primates by 
ingestion in the diet. Modern industrialized humans have shifted further, to depend very 
heavily on culture for dietary vitamin C (farmed fruit, supermarket supply chains, vitamin 
fortifications and supplements, etc.). Genes allowing for the physiological synthesis of 
vitamin C have mutated to dysfunction in primates, and in humans cultural factors have come 
to play an essential causal role in traits like skin structure that depend on vitamin C. The 
increased causal role of culture in humans does not prevent the basic features of skin 
structure and physiology shared between humans, primates (some asocial) and other 
mammals from being homologous. This is merely a further example of change in 
developmental mechanisms, as discussed in §2. The more difficult question for this section is 
whether transmission of a homologous trait can transfer between genetic and cultural 
inheritance systems. 
 In §3 we introduced a tightly delineated notion of what it is to be an inheritance 
system. An inheritance system is a mechanism with the meta-function of transmitting 
phenotypes down the generations. Acquiring such a meta-function is a very substantial 
hurdle. It is not enough that the mechanism happens to be a locus of heritable phenotypic 
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variation, as may be the case to a limited extent with, for example, the template-based 
copying of cell membrane structures (Jablonka and Lamb 2005).4 There must have been 
selection for the capacity of the mechanism to transmit phenotypes over many generations, as 
suggested in the case of DNA by the existence of proofreading and repair mechanisms.5 
Culture could support phylogenies in the ways set out in the previous section without 
constituting an inheritance system in this strict sense. 
 Transfer of transmission between genetic and cultural inheritance systems trivially 
requires that there are one or more cultural inheritance systems. That is an empirical issue 
that remains unresolved, since no one has to our knowledge shown definitively that culture 
has the requisite meta-level function (§4).6 Our primary point is that, if there are cultural 
inheritance systems, then homologies can cross the boundary between genetic and cultural 
inheritance systems. We do, however, find it plausible that some aspects of culture may have 
the requisite meta-function. For example, the peculiar way humans, but not other apes, 
‘overimitate’ when learning complex behavioural sequences (instead of performing the 
behavioural sequence that would be most efficient by rational lights) would be explicable if it 
is an adaptation for the high-fidelity transmission of behavioural phenotypes (Shea 2009). 
Moreover, the fact that culture is capable of supporting homology relations (§4) could be 
taken to support the inference that it has been evolutionarily designed for the transmission of 
adaptive variants down the generations, although byproduct explanations would be difficult 
to rule out. 
 In the examples below we consider cases where cultural factors come to be more 
involved in the development of a phenotypic trait, or less so. If culturally based transmission 
does indeed qualify as an inheritance system, then these are not just cases of change in 
developmental resources (§2), but also of transfer between inheritance systems proper. For 
example, if the initial evolution of dairy farming was partly due to selection of culturally 
transmitted factors, and these were underpinned by mechanisms that were designed to 
transmit phenotypes down the generations (as we have argued learning by overimitation 
might be), then the suite of practices forming the dairy farming phenotype was indeed 
transmitted by a cultural inheritance system. We know this generated selection pressures for 
genetic changes, such as lactose tolerance (Tishkoff et al. 2006). We can imagine one 
population undergoing sufficient genetic changes that a genetically-deficient individual in 
                                                       
4  If there has been selection for mechanisms that stabilise membrane-based inheritance over 
and above stabilising the integrity of membranes in ontogeny, then it would qualify as a 
(limited) inheritance system. 
5  Some inheritance systems may have been selected to have medium fidelity of transmission, 
with the function of transmitting phenotypes down multiple generations, but many fewer 
generations than are usually involved in genetic transmission. 
6  That there is cultural heritability does not entail that there is a cultural inheritance system, on our more 
stringent account of the latter. A particular culturally copied phenotype can confer a fitness advantage 
on individuals or groups without culture being a system that is itself selected for transmitting adaptive 
variation down the generations. 
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that population would be unable to become a dairy farmer (e.g. because of allergies), in 
which case genetic inheritance would have become integrally involved in transmission of the 
dairy farming phenotype in that population. The phenotype remains homologous, however, 
with its wholly culturally transmitted ancestor and the latter’s descendant cultural populations 
that have undergone no genetic changes in relation to lactose tolerance. 
We envision two evolutionary developmental scenarios in which homology can be 
preserved across a change in inheritance system: one in which culturally transmitted 
phenotypes become environmentally canalized through a process of ‘genetic assimilation’ 
and thereby become partly genetically transmitted; and another in which genetic transmission 
comes to be superseded by cultural processes in accordance with what we will call ‘cultural 
assimilation’. Our aim is to show that if the mechanisms of cultural evolution qualify as 
inheritance systems, then homology relations can survive across changes in transmission 
between genetic and cultural inheritance systems. This suggests that homology relations can 
survive even a complete decoupling from the genetic inheritance system—a possibility that, 
as we will see in §7, has often been overlooked in evolutionary psychology and anthropology. 
Though the scenarios we will discuss remain speculative and their relative frequencies 
unknown, genetic and cultural assimilation present two theoretically plausible avenues 
through which homology can cross inheritance systems. We discuss each of these in turn. 
 
5.2  Genetic Assimilation 
In the process of genetic assimilation (Waddington 1953), an initially plastic character is 
converted into a genetically heritable trait by selection acting on mutations that flatten the 
relevant reaction norm (Pigliucci, Murren and Schlichting 2007). Waddington offered the 
example of ostriches born with calluses at points where their skin will later abrade the 
ground, without their having experienced the friction that is the usual mechanism of callus 
formation. According to Waddington, the selection-based flattening and steepening of 
ubiquitous reaction norms is a fundamental feature of any causal interactionist picture of 
evolutionary development. This does not pose an obstacle to homology, since the flattening 
and steepening of the reaction norm alters how a trait is acquired ontogenetically, but it need 
not break the chain of phenotypic transmission itself.  
There is no reason in principle why the general mechanism identified by Waddington 
could not involve the genetic assimilation of a culturally learned phenotype, which would 
become less dependent on cultural input for its development and more canalized against 
cultural variation. To argue that this might indeed happen in practice, we point to the 
possibility of a more specialised selection process identified by Papineau (2005). His model 
envisages a complex adaptive phenotype comprised of a series of subcomponents that are 
individually necessary and only jointly sufficient for production of the trait. For instance, 
making use of a particular foodstuff may require a multi-stage extraction and purification 
process. Assuming that none of the subcomponents confers a selective advantage on its own, 
it would be fantastically improbable for all the subcomponents to arise simultaneously as a 
result of genetic mutation/recombination. Papineau’s idea is that, if the subcomponents are 
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learnable, then the complex trait might be accessible in phenotype space through learning, 
provided the benefits of the trait outweigh the considerable costs of acquiring all the 
necessary subcomponents through learning. 
To keep things simple, Papineau proposes a model in which each subcomponent is 
under the control of a single genetic locus, with one allele genetically determining the sub-
trait and an alternative allele rendering it plastic (and hence learnable). The plastic alleles 
make the complex trait accessible in the first instance, since arbitrary combinations of the 
subcomponents can be tried out much more quickly in developmental time than they can in 
phylogenetic time. Although still improbable, this could allow an individual to hit upon the 
complex phenotype entirely through learning. It is also plausible that, once discovered, the 
complex trait would be learnt by others and culturally transmitted. In a population where 
many individuals acquire all of the subcomponents through cultural learning, each non-plastic 
allele increases the probability of acquisition of one of the subcomponents, and hence of the 
complex trait. As a result, there will be selection pressure for the non-plastic allele at each 
locus, gradually leading to full genetic assimilation of the complex phenotype. 
To turn this into a case of transfer between inheritance systems, we add to Papineau’s 
model the plausible assumption that the initial cultural transmission of the subcomponents of 
the complex phenotype was achieved at least in part by mechanisms that qualify as an 
inheritance system. The result of the genetic assimilation identified by Papineau is that 
development stops depending on these culturally transmitted resources (i.e., it becomes 
canalized against such variations), with the genetic inheritance system becoming involved in 
transmission of the complex phenotype in their place. Although the phenotype shifts from 
being wholly culturally transmitted to being at least partly genetically transmitted, an 
unbroken chain of phenotypic similarity is maintained down the lineage, persisting across 
these changes in underlying developmental resources (Fig. 2). The descendant phenotype is 
therefore homologous with the similar phenotype in its ancestors. Furthermore, if the 
phenotype were found in two extant lineages, in one of which it had undergone less or even 
no genetic assimilation, then the trait would still be homologous as between the two lineages, 
despite differences in the inheritance systems involved. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Papineau’s model is purely theoretical and we are unaware of any well-documented 
cases of genetic assimilation in the cultural context. Deacon (2003) plausibly suggests that 
language is a product of genetic assimilation, and if he is correct then there may at one time 
have existed two hominin lineages possessing a homologous linguistic adaptation, one of 
which was culturally transmitted (the ancestral developmental condition) and the other 
relying increasingly on genetic transmission (the derived developmental condition). Since 
very little is known about the genetics, cognition and behaviour of early hominins, it is 
simply too early to gauge the frequency or evolutionary significance of such events. It is 
important however, when theorising about human evolution, to be aware of the possibility 
that homologies might exist across such large differences in inheritance systems (see §6). 
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5.3  Cultural Assimilation 
Now we consider whether a genetically transmitted trait such as a behavioural or cognitive 
adaptation could come to be culturally transmitted. This would be akin to a reverse Baldwin 
effect, whereby a trait that was previously transmitted by the genetic inheritance system 
comes to be acquired through learning in ontogeny. This scenario is different from the 
steepening of reaction norms contemplated by Waddington, because the phenotype need not 
become more generally plastic and may remain canalized against many forms of 
environmental variation, but with culturally transmitted resources coming to be responsible 
for more of the canalization. 
To our knowledge there is no technical term in the literature to describe the 
evolutionary scenario whereby a genetically transmitted trait evolves to rely at least in part on 
cultural inheritance systems for its transmission. To distinguish this possibility from other 
forms of genetic accommodation we use the term ‘cultural assimilation’.7 We consider two 
scenarios in which cultural assimilation of a genetically transmitted phenotype might occur, 
the first due to cultural selection reacting more quickly to changes in selective regime, the 
second resulting from developmental drift under relaxed genetic selection due to culture-
induced functional redundancy.  
The first scenario for cultural assimilation relies on the fact that cultural selection can 
respond to changes in selective environments more rapidly than gene-based selection can. 
Consider a population in a heterogeneous selective environment in which distinct geographic 
patches are characterized by distinct stable selection pressures. Even when gene flow is not 
restricted, different phenotypes can and do evolve in different patches (Brandon 1990). In a 
cultural species, selective heterogeneity can result from different cultural practices or 
lifeways, which could produce a selection pressure toward the cultural assimilation of a 
previously genetically transmitted phenotype (Fig. 3). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
The theoretical point can be illustrated with a stylised example, caricatured for the 
sake of clarity. Consider a population of hunter-gatherer hominins with a genetically 
transmitted tendency to kill large, vulnerable animals whenever they are encountered. Now 
suppose that over evolutionary time a cultural group emerges that adopts a farming lifestyle 
that includes dependence on domesticated animals. The optimal behaviour in relation to 
certain large vulnerable animals is now different, entailing that individuals protect rather than 
kill vulnerable domesticates. Let us stipulate that the ‘protect’ behaviour is not readily 
                                                       
7  ‘Cultural assimilation’ in the sense used here is to be distinguished from the scenario wherein 
a trait not transmitted by any inheritance system (e.g., an individually learned trait) comes to 
be culturally transmitted. The process just described, which is arguably common in cultural 
evolution (Gers 2011), is a cultural analog of genetic assimilation, but not one that would 
involve the shift across inheritance systems that we contemplate in this paper. Note that if one 
takes a broader view of cultural assimilation such that it includes the cultural cooptation and 
transmission of individually learned behaviors, then the process of cultural assimilation need 
not begin with a genetic mutation or innovation. 
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accessible through genetic mutation whereas the ‘kill’ phenotype is. Instead, the ‘protect’ 
behaviour is accessible through a mutation for behavioural plasticity, combined with cultural 
learning of the ecologically appropriate treatment of domesticates. Given significant gene 
flow between cultural groups, the hunter-gatherer lineage would also become plastic in their 
animal-response behaviour, but with little selective cost because the pre-existing ‘kill’ 
phenotype is already present and readily available for cultural acquisition. The effect of 
selection for cultural transmission of the ‘protect’ phenotype in the farmers is to make the 
‘kill’ phenotype culturally transmitted in the hunters. There would then be no break in the 
‘kill’ trait in the hunter-gatherers, preserving homology relations across inheritance systems. 
 In the second scenario, a genetic function is rendered selectively redundant due to the 
reliable cultural acquisition of the relevant trait, which is culturally copied in a population 
from its initial genetic origin. It is well established in molecular evolutionary biology that 
gene duplication can result in functional redundancy that relaxes stabilising selection and 
allows one of the duplicates to vary without negatively impacting on fitness (Lynch and 
Conery 2000; Wagner 2008). Much as gene duplications are subject to mutation and random 
drift in the absence of selection, so too are genetic variants that have become functionally 
redundant due to cultural transmission of their associated phenotype. If all genetic variants 
initially selected for producing the trait have degraded in this manner, or gone extinct, then 
the process of cultural assimilation would be complete. 
 Cultural assimilation would not occur if it were significantly more costly to acquire 
the trait through cultural learning rather than automatically via genetic resources (an 
assumption made by Papineau’s model in §5.2 above). However, it is plausible that the costs 
might be symmetrical in some cases, since high-fidelity cultural transmission processes like 
‘blind’ copying by overimitation do not incur the costs of individual trial and error learning. 
Indeed, cultural assimilation may occur as a more or less automatic result of general 
mechanisms of cultural learning, once genetic selection has raised the populational frequency 
of the trait to a significant level. In this way, cultural transmission could take off before gene-
based selection has driven the trait to fixation, reducing selection pressures on the genetic 
variant and increasing the chance that it will be subject to stochastic extinction (Fig. 4).  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Cultural assimilation may be further driven by its ability to break down pleiotropic 
linkages that constrain genetic evolution. Pleiotropy refers to the situation in which a gene 
associated with a fitness-enhancing trait has non-selected (and often deleterious) effects on 
other traits. If these deleterious collateral consequences are severe, even a highly fitness 
enhancing trait could be purged from the gene pool. By decoupling a trait from its genetic 
origin, cultural assimilation could avoid these deleterious side effects, thus enabling a lineage 
to occupy fitness enhancing regions of adaptive space that pleiotropic effects would 
otherwise have placed off limits. 
In both examples of cultural assimilation, a trait originates only once in an ancestral 
clade via genetic mutation or recombination, and is maintained continuously in a descendant 
lineage through mechanisms of social learning. The character state resemblance between the 
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ancestral and derived developmental conditions is a clear-cut case of homology, so long as it 
was exhibited by all historical populations dating back to their last common ancestor. 
Although the two-way evolutionary interaction between genetic and cultural 
transmission has been rigorously investigated, the particular gene-culture interaction that we 
contemplate in the case of cultural assimilation has not to our knowledge been discussed or 
modeled in the literature on ‘dual-inheritance’. Dual inheritance models have typically 
captured the causal evolutionary interaction between different traits underwritten by different 
modes of transmission. For instance, the cultural transmission of dairy farming created 
selection pressures for genes associated with lactose processing. Most examples of gene-
culture coevolution are of this structure (e.g., yam cultivation generates selection for gene-
based malaria resistance; culturally transmitted mate preference for trait T generates a genetic 
selection pressure for genes associated with T, etc.). The reverse causal sequence would see a 
genetic innovation (such as a gene for incest avoidance) generate a selection pressure for a 
cultural innovation (such as an incest taboo that reinforces the genetic trait).  
In contrast, in cultural assimilation the presence of one trait does not generate a 
selection pressure for another. Rather, the whole system is under stabilizing selection for a 
single trait, the transmission of which is ‘offloaded’ from genes to social transmission. There 
are some gene-culture coevolutionary models that come closer to capturing these dynamics. 
For example, Laland (2008) offers a model showing that a genetic predisposition (e.g., right 
handedness) can be reinforced by cultural copying biases, which act in conjunction with 
genetic selection to drive the trait to some non-trivial frequency. Our account differs from 
such ‘cultural reinforcement’ models in that (1) it contemplates the complete extinction of the 
genetic basis due to sampling error, given the rapidity of cultural acquisition and its 
dampening effect on the relative fitness value of gene-based behavioral innovations, and (2) it 
considers the role of plasticity in a heterogeneous selective environment and how this might 
drive cultural assimilation processes. 
 In concluding this section, we note that homology relations will not be preserved in 
all instances where a selective function is transferred from genes to culture. Consider the 
universal human cultural adaptation for cooking, which functions as an external mode of 
digestion and a method for sanitizing potentially contaminated foods. Thermal processing 
increases the digestibility of nutrients per unit of food consumed, and it tenderizes high-
collagen meats that would otherwise require substantial chewing expenditures (Carmody and 
Wrangham 2009). Cooking appears to have rendered a number of genetic functions otiose, 
including those associated with olfactory acuity and masticatory muscle strength (Powell 
2012). While chewing meat and cooking meat perform the same function, in this case there is 
no character resemblance that calls for a homology assessment. Taxic homologies do not 
describe similar functions whatever their morphology, but rather similar morphologies 
whatever their function. 
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6. Extension to Alternative Homology Concepts 
Thus far we have been working with the standard taxic homology concept. Does our point 
about homology crossing inheritance systems also apply to alternative, non-taxic accounts of 
homology?  
 The main idea behind the developmental account is that homology relations are 
grounded in shared mechanisms of development, rather than patterns of phenotypic 
similarity. Wagner (1989/2007) articulates this in terms of shared developmental constraints 
or genetic regulatory networks. Our central claim is that an unbroken lineage of phenotypic 
similarity can persist across large changes in developmental mechanisms, including across 
inheritance systems. Some prominent views of homology, such as Hall’s (2008/2013) 
hierarchical account (see also Ramsey and Peterson 2012), have little conceptual difficulty 
accommodating such cases since they allow homology at one level to be decoupled from 
homology at a lower level. Such cases also fall un-problematically within the general taxic 
conception of homology that we have relied upon. In contrast, the cases of radical decoupling 
that we envision would not count as homologous on Wagner’s account, despite the fact that 
they involve shared character states inherited continuously from a common ancestor and so 
count as homologous on the taxic conception. Given that Wagner focuses on shared 
“developmental constraints…caused by locally acting self-regulatory mechanisms of organ 
differentiation” (Wagner 1989, p. 62), it is not clear that his definition would apply to 
cognitive or behavioural phenotypes at all.  
This is not all that surprising, given that the homology literature has tended to focus 
on structural morphology, rather than on behavior or aspects of the extended phenotype that 
may be the subject of cultural inheritance. There are strong reasons, however, to prefer a 
unified, hierarchical account of homology (e.g. Currie forthcoming) that can accommodate all 
aspects of the organism that are subject to phylogenetic assessment. Methodologically, the 
task of reconstructing evolutionary histories can be enriched and our phylogenetic hypotheses 
sharpened by incorporating behaviors and other non-structural traits into the analysis. 
Theoretically, a concept as fundamental as homology should be capable of unifying traits at 
all levels of the biological hierarchy—especially those that play important roles in ecology 
and evolution, as behavioral and cultural traits often do. Hierarchical accounts of homology 
have these methodological and unifying virtues. They can accommodate not only 
homologous non-structural phenotypes that have become decoupled from their structural, 
cognitive, or genetic moorings (Hall 2013), but also those that have undergone complete 
dissociation from their underlying developmental constraints—such as homologous traits that 
have undergone complete shifts across inheritance systems. 
 An alternative version of the developmental homology concept hinges on the same 
biological information being involved in the development of a trait over evolutionary time 
(Van Valen 1982; Roth 1991; Wiley and Lieberman 2011, 120-121). The lacuna in this view 
is to specify information in such a way that the same information sometimes is, and 
sometimes is not, involved in the development of similar traits. One version of this view (not 
necessarily attributable to the aforementioned authors) holds that the genome carries 
information which programs or specifies a given outcome, and that this biological 
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information can persist across changes in the patchwork of intervening developmental 
processes. We resist this account since, as discussed in §3, we doubt that genes program or 
specify phenotypic outcomes in anything like this sense. However, if informational resources 
could be adequately specified at the epigenetic or cultural level, there is no reason to think 
they could not survive the switch between genetic and cultural inheritance that we have 
contemplated in this paper, since information is not tied to any particular biological substrate. 
So again homology could subsist across a change in inheritance system. 
 In sum, although certain developmental homology accounts might be compatible with 
some of the homologies across inheritance systems that we identified above, these accounts 
either lack specificity or fail to cover cases where character similarities are clearly the result 
of common descent and should thus be counted as homologies. 
  
7. Illustration: The Phylogeny of Intergroup Violence in Hominins 
We will now consider the implications of the above discussion for debates over the 
phylogeny of similar behaviours in humans and chimpanzees. For illustrative purposes, we 
will focus on one widely discussed trait resemblance: male-initiated intergroup aggression. 
Does human out-group violence originate in our common ancestry with chimps? 
Some sociocultural anthropologists have rejected the notion that we have much to 
learn about the origins of complex cognitive and behavioural traits in humans by studying 
their ostensible precursors in chimpanzees and other primates (Marks 2003). This conclusion 
is partly based on observations indicating that many behavioural characteristics that humans 
appear to share with chimpanzees, such as intergroup violence, infanticide and patriarchal 
social relations, are culturally sensitive in humans but not in chimps (Sponsel 2010; Sussman 
1999; Bock 1980). The coupling of homology judgments to developmental properties is 
evident in the Seville Statement of 1986 on the biology of human aggression, adopted by 
UNESCO and endorsed by more than a dozen scientific and professional associations 
(Adams and Buchanan 1990): 
[I]t is scientifically incorrect to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our 
animal ancestors…The fact that warfare has changed so radically over time indicates that it is a 
product of culture (First Proposition). 
Fundamental differences in developmental acquisition are thus taken to imply that intergroup 
aggression in humans and chimps is not the result of shared ancestry. 
Evolutionary psychologists who are inclined to consult the cognitive and behavioural 
characteristics of chimpanzees in order to gain insights into the origins of similar traits in the 
human lineage have done little to challenge this assumption. If anything, they have reinforced 
it by tying homology judgments to inferences and arguments about genetically evolved 
propensities, and by contrasting these with traits that develop under primarily cultural 
influences (e.g. Van Vugt 2009; Wrangham 2010/1995). For example, where a similar 
cognitive or behavioural trait that humans share with other primates (e.g., a ‘sense of 
fairness’) is acquired in humans via a general cultural learning device, evolutionary 
psychologists tend to conclude that the trait is non-homologous and perhaps not even an 
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evolved trait at all (see, e.g., Machery and Mallon 2011). As noted in §2, such authors appear 
to reason as follows: if a behavioural trait exhibited by humans and a closely related taxon is 
homologous, then it follows that the trait in both clades is genetically transmitted and 
resistant to cultural perturbation (cf. Ehrlich 2000, 210; Kitcher 1987, 64-65). 
‘Intergroup aggression’ refers to one social group cooperating in threatening, chasing, 
striking, wounding or killing members of conspecific groups. This often involves ‘raiding’, in 
which bands of males from one social group ‘hunt’, ambush and kill members of another 
group. Pre-meditated, fatal attacks on neighbouring groups are routinely carried out by 
common chimpanzees (Wilson and Wrangham 2003), often involving horrific mutilation of 
the victim that goes well beyond sufficient lethal force. There are of course significant 
differences between human and chimp manifestations of intergroup violence – language-
based coordination and the use of technical weaponry are dimensions of warfare that are 
obviously lacking in chimps. But homology relations rest not on identity but similarity. 
Cultural traits like intergroup violence may vary in structure and function, much as the 
forelimbs of bats and giraffes vary in structure and function, but they will still be homologous 
so long as the similarities they do exhibit are the result of continuous descent from a common 
ancestor. 
In their seminal paper comparing adaptive intergroup violence in chimpanzees and 
human hunter-gatherer groups, Manson and Wrangham (1991, 370) wrote that “[t]he 
similarities between chimpanzees and humans suggest a common evolutionary background. 
Thus, they indicate that lethal male raiding could have had precultural origins and might be 
elicited by the same set of conditions among humans as among chimpanzees.” One might 
read this passage as implying that intergroup violence is homologous, having evolved only 
once in a common ancestor of humans and chimps. In their reply to commentaries, however, 
Manson and Wrangham (1991, 385) made it clear that by ‘common evolutionary 
background’, they meant only to suggest that intergroup violence might have evolved under 
similar ecological conditions in both lineages.  
Subsequently, however, Wrangham (1995) argued for homology on the grounds that 
coalitional violence appears to be genetically transmitted and developmentally canalized in 
both lineages. Because humans and chimps seem to share these ‘innate’ behavioural 
dispositions and psychological mechanisms:  
The implication is that strong aspects of human violence have long evolutionary roots…In 
our aggressive urges we are not Gauguin’s creatures of culture. We are apes of nature cursed 
over 6 million years or more with a rare inheritance, a Dostoyevskyan demon…The 
coincidence of demonic aggression in ourselves and our closest kin bespeaks its antiquity 
(1995, 7). 
Likewise, in Demonic Males (1996), Wrangham and Peterson suggest that coalitional 
violence is genetically based in both lineages and may be traced continuously all the way 
back to the last common ancestor. Although Wrangham (2010) concedes that this 
phylogenetic question remains unresolved, he assumes that its resolution will turn on genetic 
or neurobiological data, thereby coupling the mode of ontogeny with evidence for or against 
continuous phylogeny. Thus, Wrangham and colleagues tie homology judgments to shared 
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developmental profile, and implicitly endorse the reverse: that is, an inference from disparate 
developmental profile to non-homology. Many anthropologists rely on the same conditional 
but reach the opposite conclusion, because they think that intergroup violence in humans is 
culturally acquired rather than genetically specified (see e.g. Bock 1980, 76), and thus they 
reject the claim that we are observing the same (read: continuously transmitted) character in 
chimps and humans (Sussman 1999). 
 While we have acknowledged that the developmental basis of a character resemblance 
is relevant to assessing homology, we have also argued that it is not definitive. Even if the 
tendency to direct aggression toward out-group members is culturally sensitive in humans but 
culturally insensitive in chimpanzees, this alone does not entail that the traits are non-
homologous. We do not dispute the general applicability of the principle of “evolutionary 
parsimony” (de Waal 1997), which holds that a shared trait in closely related taxa is likely 
produced by shared proximate mechanisms. But this principle should be applied cautiously in 
the case of labile behavioral traits, and even more carefully in the context of robustly cultural 
species. The phylogeny of intergroup violence is unclear on the present state of the evidence, 
and is complicated by the relatively peaceful bonobo, which is as closely related to humans as 
is the common chimpanzee. Our aim here is not to review the evidence. We only wish to 
argue that homology in relation to any trait, be it cognitive, behavioral or morphological, 
should not hang on shared developmental mechanisms or shared inheritance systems, as has 
often been assumed. This is particularly true in the case of species that rely heavily on social 
learning for their development, since homologies can subsist across shifts between genetic 
and cultural inheritance systems. 
We have focused on the conceptual question as to whether homology can be 
preserved across inheritance systems, and we have investigated the theoretical plausibility of 
this result. We have said little about the epistemic difficulties that are likely to be encountered 
in attempting to identify actual instances of this phenomenon. It seems to us, however, that 
these epistemic challenges are comparable in kind and magnitude to those confronting 
homology/homoplasy assessments of character resemblances with disparate developmental 
underpinnings in general, and of behavioral resemblances in particular—and we believe that 
the methods employed to address these challenges in the present case would be 
correspondingly similar (cf. Rendall and Di Fiore 2007, 518). 
 Even if it could be determined with high levels of confidence that, for example, the 
last common ancestor of chimps and humans exhibited intergroup aggression, how could we 
be reasonably certain that this trait was continuously transmitted in Pan and Homo lines since 
their split, only to be lost in the bonobo? The epistemic problem of inferring continuous 
transmission of a putative ancestral trait is one that confronts phylogenetic reconstruction in 
general, and need not pose any particular difficulties for the phylogenetic reconstruction of 
behavioral traits. Nevertheless, complications arise in relation to plastic or dispositional 
traits—to wit, traits that are conditionally expressed or that develop only in certain 
environments (as is the case for many behaviors, such as the dominance displays of high-
ranking males). This has led some homology theorists, such as Ramsey and Peterson (2012), 
to hold that homology can be preserved despite a break in phenotypic continuity so long as 
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there is continuity “one level down” in development (such as a continuously transmitted 
genetic disposition for a plastic trait). We maintain, however, following Currie (forthcoming), 
that a dispositional account of characters is sufficient to establish phenotypic continuity in 
cases of conditionally expressed traits. On this view, phenotypic continuity can be established 
via analysis of developmental counterfactuals: If it can be shown that non-pathological 
ancestral individuals or populations would have expressed descendent trait T (e.g. intergroup 
violence) had such and such environmental conditions been present, then phenotypic 
continuity in T will have been established.8 
 
8. Conclusion 
Culture is not a mere byproduct of the collective human imagination or capacity for rational 
agency. It is very likely to be, at least in some crucial respects, an adaptive product of 
biological evolution. If it is more than that, and aspects of cultural transmission have been 
designed for the ability to transmit phenotypic variants down the generations, then there are 
one or more cultural inheritance systems. And as we have shown, homology relations can be 
preserved across changes between genetic and cultural streams of inheritance. The frequency 
and evolutionary significance of phenomena like genetic and cultural assimilation remain 
unknown. In any case, it is an important feature of the homology concept that it can transcend 
the developmental constraints and even inheritance systems underlying a character 
resemblance. Wrangham (1995, 7) may be correct that ‘the coincidence of demonic 
aggression in ourselves and our closest kin bespeaks its antiquity’, but we should not assume 
that the antiquity of a trait implies that it must be produced by the same developmental 
mechanisms, or transmitted by the same inheritance system, in modern humans. 
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8  Further complications arise due to the fact that selection on conserved developmental mechanisms can 
result in the repeated origination (and loss) of a trait in a bushy clade (i.e., ‘parallelism’)—which one 
may (Ramsey and Peterson 2012) or may not (Currie forthcoming) prefer to categorize as homologs. 
Furthermore, one might think that behavioural traits, such as intergroup hostility, will be especially 
prone to iterated evolution, given that they are labile, only loosely tied to structure, and partly 
functionally delineated. In fact, insofar as this lability entails greater degrees of freedom in alternative 
character state space, the phylogenetic signal of behaviors and culturally acquired traits will be less 
prone to homoplastic noise (Rendall and Di Fiore 2007). In any case, these are epistemic difficulties 
that confront the homologization of behavioral characters in general, not simply those implicating 
cultural traits or shifts across inheritance systems. A full treatment of these important issues lies 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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Ancestors are shown at the top of the diagram. In the right-hand lineage three 
of the genes ancestrally involved in development of trait T become replaced by 
alternative genetic causes, while in the left-hand lineage the ancestral 
developmental condition is retained. Trait T remains homologous between the 








































FIGURE 2. Genetic Assimilation 
 
In the right-hand lineage, culturally transmitted resources ancestrally 
involved in the development of trait T become progressively replaced by 
genes (which bias development towards T), while in the left-hand lineage 
the ancestral developmental condition is retained. T remains homologous 



















































FIGURE 3. Cultural Assimilation: Case 1 
 
 
In the right-hand lineage, which occupies a stable heterogeneous selective environment 
with respect to ancestral trait T, a new culturally transmitted practice C* gives rise to novel 
adaptive trait T* in cultural population 1, while in cultural population 2 T remains adaptive 
and gene G, along with a non-cultural environment, ensures the reliable development of T. 
That introduces a selection pressure against G (which biases development towards T) in 
population 1, causing a new cultural variant C to become causally involved in the 
development of T in population 2. As a result, transmission of C by a cultural inheritance 
system becomes crucial for the maintenance of what was previously a gene-based trait 
within that cultural group. At the end of the process, T remains homologous between the 





















































At Time 1 in a cultural population, novel genetic variant G increases the probability of 
acquiring adaptive behavioural trait T*, which is a fitness-enhancing modification of 
cultural ancestral trait T. At Time 2, G (and hence T*) increases in frequency in the 
population, while group members lacking G begin to develop T* through social learning 
from extant examples of T* using novel cultural resource C* to acquire the successful 
strategy. Cultural acquisition of T* nullifies the relative fitness advantage of G and, given 
G’s low standing frequency in the population, sets the stage for its stochastic extinction as 
shown at Times 3 and 4, resulting in full cultural assimilation of T*. Note that although at 
Time 3 the population remains heterogeneous with respect to the inheritance system 
transmitting T*, all instances of T* are homologous since they descend from a common 
populational ancestor which possessed T*. 
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